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The article provides an account of how international labour law, which had 
previously been promulgated mostly by the International Labour Organization, 
has been confronted by a new type of “global” labour law that has arisen from 
recent changes in the structure of employment brought about by the advent of 
globalization and multinational corporations. These rival influences on the regu-
lation of labour have not yet reached a stable and productive accommodation to 
each other, and the author identifies several points of contact and conflict between 
them, as well as some of the background forces that bear on those conflicts. The 
article also evaluates several suggestions for the way the relationship between 
them should be managed. Separate attention is devoted to the possibility of link-
age between the application of international labour standards and international 
trade. To date, the negotiations on inclusion of the “social clause” in the agree-
ments on international trade within the WTO framework have been unsuccessful. 
However, the author considers that the current infrequent and weak linkage of 
international trade agreements with labour issues is inadequate, and concludes 
that significant limitation of the free flow of capital from one country to another 
is needed in order to avoid the “race to the bottom” between developing countries 
that leads to the degradation of the labour rights regime worldwide.  
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I. INTRODUCTION1
Since its inception in 1919 the International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
has traditionally been the dominant force in establishing international labour 
standards (ILS). Parallel to that effort, the ILO has also promulgated labour 
standards through the United Nations and regional international intergovern-
mental organizations such as the European Council and others. Nevertheless, 
near the end of the 20th century the effective monopoly on spreading ILS held 
by the “classical” international organizations began to encounter more and 
more competitors of other kinds: multinational corporations (MNC), interna-
tional trade union associations, non-governmental organisations, and separate 
governments.
This article provides an exposition of the interactions between traditional 
norms for international labour law (ILL) and the new ILS in order to deter-
mine to what extent these two systems supplement each other or interfere with 
each other.
II. GLOBALIZATION AND REGIONAL INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
AS THEY AFFECT LABOUR
One paradoxical effect of the Cold War was the positive influence it had 
on the establishment of social standards. The two opposing socio-political 
systems had an interest in showing how attractive they could be to ordinary 
people, and not only to their own citizens but also to the enemy camp. The 
familiar concept of the European welfare state2 that held sway throughout 
Western Europe after World War II was to a large extent offered as an alterna-
tive to communist ideology. Therefore, the end of the Cold War caused some 
difficulties in economically developed capitalist countries. Those governments 
had less reason to support social standards once the alternative (communist) 
1 This article was written as part of scientific research Project No. 29.5015.2017/B.
Ch. commissioned by the RF Ministry of Education and Science.
2 For current approaches to the concept of the welfare state see: G. Esping-Andersen 
et al. (ed.), Why We Need a New Welfare State, New York: Oxford University Press, 
2002; J. Lewis, R. Surender (eds.), Welfare State Change: Towards a Third Way?, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004; P. Taylor-Gooby (ed.), New Risks, New Wel-
fare. The Transformation of the European Welfare State, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2004; B. Jessop, The Future of the Capitalist State, Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2005; P. Pierson (ed.), The New Politics of the Welfare State, New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2001, among others. 
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model of development had been discredited and the leftist opposition had 
nothing specific to show the powers that be. By the beginning of the 21st 
century national labour law had arrived at such a critical state that there was 
even anxious discussion of “the death of labour law”.3 This weakening of social 
standards was also connected with the declining trend of the labour movement 
in economically developed countries brought on not only by globalization, but 
also by changes in labour relations due to the growth of the service sector and 
the erosion of the influential social status that the working class held during 
the era of industrialization.4 Today’s trade unions cannot hope to spearhead 
labour law as they had in Western bloc developed countries during the 20th 
century when they could demand that governments allow them “collective 
laissez-faire” as envisaged by Otto Kahn-Freund, the doyen of German, British, 
and comparative studies of labour law.5 
3 For example: R. Blanpain, The End of Labour Law?, in R. Blanpain, M. Tiraboschi 
(eds.), The global Labour Market: From globalization to Flexicurity, Bulletin of Compara-
tive Labour Relations, No. 65, Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2007, 
at 11; R. Mitchell (ed.), Redefining Labour Law, Melbourne: Centre for Employment 
and Labour Relations Law, 1995; C. Barnard, S. Deakin, G. S. Morris (eds.), The 
Future of Labour Law: Liber Amicorum Sir Bob Hepple QC, Oxford and Portland, 
Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2004; R. Blanpain, M. Weiss (eds.), Changing Industrial 
Relations and Modernisation of Labour Law: Liber Amicorum in Honour of Professor Mar-
co Biagi, London: Kluwer Law International, 2003; G. Davidov, B. Langille (eds.), 
Boundaries and Frontiers of Labour Law, Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishi-
ng, 2006; Ch. Arup, P. Gahan, J. Howe et al. (eds.), Labour Law and Labour Market 
Regulation, Sydney: The Federation Press, 2006; J. Conaghan, R. M. Fischl, K. Klare 
(eds.), Labour Law in an Era of globalization, Oxford, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2005; among other sources.
4 See: S. Fernie, D. Metcalf (eds.), Trade Unions: Resurgence or Demise?, London: 
Routledge, 2005; J. Harrod,  R. O’Brien (eds.), global Unions? Theory and Strate-
gies of Organized Labour in the global Political Economy, New York: Routledge, 2002; 
T. Boeri, A. Brugiavini, L. Calmfors (eds.), The Role of Unions in the Twenty-First 
Century: A report for the Fondazione Rodolfo Debenedetti, Oxford: Oxford Scholarship, 
2001; C. Phelan (ed.), Trade Union Revitalisation: Trends and Prospects in 34 Countries, 
Oxford: Peter Lang, 2007; H. N. Wheeler, The Future of the American Labor Movement, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002; H. N. Wheeler, B. S. Klaas, D. 
M. Mahon, Workplace Justice Without Unions, Kalamazoo, Michigan: W. E. Upjohn 
Institute for Employment Research, 2004; T. A. Kochan, H. C. Katz, R. B. McKer-
sie, The Transformation of American Industrial Relations, Ithaca, NY: ILR Press, 1994; 
among others.
5 O. Kahn-Freund, Legal Framework, in A. Flanders, H. A. Clegg, (eds.), The System of 
Industrial Relations in great Britain: Its History, Law and Institutions, London: 
Blackwell, 1954.
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The collapse of the socialist system in the USSR and Soviet bloc countries 
brought about a crucial reconsideration of the ILO’s mission going forward. 
Because the Cold War had ended and because a large number of ILS had 
already been accepted, it was argued that the continued existence of the ILO 
made little sense.6 However, a new role for the ILO soon came to light as glo-
balization of international relations and trade developed. Even from the end 
of the 1960s and up to the beginning of the 1980s societies around the world 
were beginning to regard the actions of MNC with growing apprehension. 
With the liberalization of international trade, the relative “footprint” occupied 
by MNC in the world economy increased many times over. Governments and 
trade unions were disturbed by the growing influence of MNC, the absence of 
any practical means to control their actions, and their discriminatory labour 
practices, which corporations within developing countries soon also adopted. 
Studies have shown that MNC try to transfer production to enterprises where 
there is no trade union to represent the workers and that they are willing to 
“tolerate” trade unions only if there is absolutely no alternative.7
Because of their immense scale and the financial resources at their disposal, 
MNC have been able to confront governments, as it were, on an equal footing 
with them. As MNC extended beyond any practical control by the standards 
of national and international law, a special term was coined: there was a govern-
ance gap.8 
Although an attempt was made under United Nations auspices to prom-
ulgate rules for social policy that would be mandatory for MNC, this effort 
failed. In 1976 the OECD adopted the advisory Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises.9 In the following year the ILO adopted its Tripartite Declaration 
of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, which 
6 For more on this see: W. B. Creighton, The Internationalisation of Labour Law, in R. 
Mitchell (ed.), Redefining Labour Law, Melbourne: Centre for Employment and La-
bour Relations Law, 1995, at 96.
7 W. N. Cooke, Multinationals, globalisation and Industrial Relations, in M. J. Morley, 
P. Gunningle, D. G. Collings (eds.), global Industrial Relations, London and New 
York: Routledge, 2006, at 343.
8 See for example: C. M. Drauth, Closing governing gaps Through Corporate Social Res-
ponsibility? Conditions for the Effectiveness of the OECD guidelines, the ILO Declaration 
and the UN global Compact in Ensuring Responsible Business Conduct, Hertie School 
of Governance Working Papers – No. 54, August 2010. Available at: https://www.
hertie-school.org/fileadmin/images/Downloads/working_papers/54.pdf.
9 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development guidelines for Multinational En-
terprises. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/daf/investment/guidelines.
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disappointed many specialists in the field because of its merely advisory nature 
and vague wording.10 Despite the passage of this Declaration in 1977, no ef-
fective means were found for international law to impose obligations on MNC 
in the same way that it had imposed them on sovereign states.11 In the late 
1990s international organizations took up the challenge of applying specific 
standards to MNC. The most prominent of these were the ILO Declaration 
on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work of 1998 and the elaboration 
of the Decent Work Programme12, as well as the UN Global Compact.13 The 
Global Compact, where it pertains to labour, promulgates the very same prin-
ciples as the ILO Declaration of 1998. However, the emphasis is on having 
MNC rather than governments adhere to them. This programme came under 
attack by international trade union activists who claimed that the MNC sub-
scribing to it were continuing to violate labour law even though they now had 
the “seal of approval” of the UN.14
The concept of Decent Work was later incorporated in the programmes of 
the ILO and was referred to as such in the ILO Declaration on Social Justice 
for a Fair Globalization of 2008.15 As governments of developing countries 
took their place in the ILO, that organization put more emphasis on the prob-
lems of developing countries, including the interaction of MNC with their gov-
ernments. The adoption of new ILO conventions as well as previously ratified 
ones ran into substantial obstacles because of the disputes between wealthy 
10 B. Hepple, Labour Laws and global Trade, Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Pu-
blishing, 2005, at 70.
11 K. D., Ewing, International Labour Standards, in M. J. Morley, P. Gunningle, D. G. 
Collings (eds.), global industrial relations, London and New York: Routledge, 2006, 
at 246.
12 The first reference to the term “decent work” was in the following report: Decent 
Work. A Report of the ILO Director general to the International Labour Conference, Ge-
neva, 1999. Available at: http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc87/
rep-i.htm.
13 See: The ILO’s Decent Work page (http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/decent-work/
lang--en/index.htm); United Nations, Global Compact (Labour) (http://www.unglo-
balcompact.org/Issues/Labour/).
14 TRAC–Transnational Resource & Action Center. For more detail on this line of 
criticism see: Tangled Up In Blue: Corporate Partnerships at the United Nations. Avail-
able at: http://s3.amazonaws.com/corpwatch.org/downloads/tangled.pdf.
15 See: http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---cabinet/documents/
publication/wcms_100193.pdf. For more detail on this see: J.-M. Servais, A New 
Declaration at the ILO: What For?, European Labour Law Journal, Vol. 1, No. 2, 
2010, at 286 – 300.
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and poor countries. These arose from the differing motivations of developed 
and developing countries as they dealt with constructing a suitable relation-
ship between MNC and government. The problem of squaring acceptance of 
standards for ILL with protectionist tendencies is still with us. Developing 
countries often accuse economically developed governments of using ILS to 
erect barriers to international trade.16 
Some authors have suggested linking adherence to ILO norms to interna-
tional trade in order to increase compliance with ILO standards.17 To a certain 
extent, this sort of linkage is already a part of international practices that are 
independent of ILO activity.18 Other specialists, on the contrary, criticize the 
ILO because it intervenes with its own direct mandates and meddles in is-
sues that are the proper responsibility of other international organizations.19 
This critique gains its force from paragraph II(d) of the 1944 Declaration of 
Philadelphia to the effect that the ILO is “... to examine and consider all in-
ternational economic and financial policies and measures in the light of this 
fundamental objective.”20 The basic activity of the ILO – to secure the adop-
tion of ILS and ensure compliance with them – would be severely restricted by 
this interpretation.
In addition, a rather large number of international organizations involved 
in human rights issues exist within both the UN and the ILO, although most of 
them fall within the UN. There is the UN Development Programme (UNDP), 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the 
United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the International 
16 On this topic see: J. M. Salazar-Xirinachs, Should There be Enforceable International 
Labor Standards: The Perspective of Developing Countries, comments presented at the 
Fifth Annual Conference on Public Service and the Law at University of Virginia 
School of Law, February 28, 2004. Available at: http://www.oas.org/en/sedi/desd/
trade/pubs/STAFF_ARTICLE/jmsx04_Univ_VA_comments.pdf.
17 Ch. Barry, S. G. Reddy, International Trade & Labor Standards: A Proposal for Linkage, 
New York: Columbia University Press, 2008; among others.
18 For example, in the systems of trade preferences in use by the USA and the EU, 
about which see below for more detail.
19 W. R. Simpson, Standard-setting and Supervision: A System in Difficulty, in Les normes 
internationales du travail: un patrimoine pour l’avenir - Mélanges en l’honneur de Nicolas 
Valticos, Geneva: BIT, 2004, at 59 – 61.
20 As it is stated in the same clause, the fundamental objective of the ILO is ensuring 
that “all human beings, irrespective of race, creed or sex, have the right to pursue 
both their material well-being and their spiritual development in conditions of free-
dom and dignity, of economic security and equal opportunity”.
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Social Security Association (ISSA), the World Health Organization (WHO), 
and many others. The ILO works hand in hand with most of them.
However, it would not be very useful to require that the ILO limit its scope 
to questions directly concerned with the establishment and observance of ILS 
and yet completely refrain from addressing economic and political issues. For 
a long time – and with heightened intensity from 1996 to 1999 – debates have 
gone on about how what has been called the “social clause” pertains to the 
ILO’s challenges in regulating international trade within the World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO) framework for international trade unions, associations of 
employers, and the governments of both developed and developing countries. 
At the 1996 WTO Ministerial Conference in Singapore all the participants 
gave their support to a general agreement to adhere to fundamental labour 
rights and principles as they were understood by the ILO. However, as the 
final Declaration of the Conference stipulated, labour standards may not be 
used to further protectionism. Without questioning the economic preferences 
accorded to less wealthy countries, the Declaration indicated that the WTO 
and ILO should continue to cooperate. Hence, the Singapore Declaration of 
1996 did not put labour matters on the WTO agenda.21 The basic argument 
of those who oppose linking trade and labour standards under the WTO is 
usually called the “Christmas tree” argument.22 It maintains that the process 
of globalization impinges on a great many social issues so that linking each of 
them to free trade is like hanging too many ornaments on a Christmas tree: 
the system of international trade agreements would simply collapse. This argu-
ment among others has appeared in a joint statement by three former general 
directors of the WTO.23 In addition, advocates of economic liberalism main-
tain that open markets lead to accelerated economic growth in developing 
countries and that this will in the end lead to improved conditions for labour.24 
21 Singapore Ministerial Declaration, 1996. Available at: http://www.wto.org/english/
theWTO_e/minist_e/min96_e/wtodec_e.htm. 
22 For more detail on this topic see: N. Lyutov, Vsemirnaya torgovaya organizatsiia: pers-
pektivy uchastiia v mezhdunarodnykh trudovykh standartov [WTO: Prospects for its Partici-
pation in Establishing International Labour Standards], Trudovoe pravo [Labour Law], 
No. 7, 2009, at 80 – 84.
23 A. Dunkel, P. Sutherland, R. Ruggiero, Joint statement on the multilateral trading 
system, dated 1 February 2001. Available at: http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/
news01_e/jointstatdavos_jan01_e.htm. 
24 F. Mansoor, The WTO versus the ILO and the case of child labour, Web Journal of Cur-
rent Legal Issues, No. 2, 2004. Available at: http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/2004/issue2/
mansoor2.html.
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The recent experience of “shock therapy” in Russia provides ample testimony 
that accepting these arguments leads only to economic devastation and mis-
ery, and so does the fact that all the currently developed states began their eco-
nomic surge during the era of industrialization while zealously protecting their 
internal markets from imports. The familiar phrase laissez-faire was uttered by 
French merchants to Jean-Baptiste Colbert in answer to his query about how 
the government might help them, but it was said following an extremely long 
period of state protectionism.
The idea that international-legal regulation of trade relations under the 
WTO has nothing to do with labour relations does not correspond to reality. 
Under current conditions the most important way to compel governments to 
respect ILS is the prospect of economic pressure, not the “toothless” mecha-
nisms of the ILO and other international organizations.25 This pressure may 
take the form of including a “social clause” in international trade agreements 
or through unilateral actions such as the general trade preference systems of 
the USA and the EU.26 For WTO member states, however, restricting imports 
or erecting trade barriers with respect to other member states is permissible 
25 See: A. D. A. Vandaele, International Labour Rghts and the Social Clause: Friends or 
Foes, London: Cameron May, 2005, at 319 – 350; J. Atleson, L. Compa, K. Rittich 
et al., International Labor Law: Cases and Materials on Workers’ Rights in the Global 
Economy, St. Paul: Thomson-West, 2008, at 88 – 104; Barry, Reddy, op. cit. (fn. 
17), at 43, 184; K. A. Elliot, R. B. Freeman, Can Labor Standards Improve Under glo-
balization?, Washington DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2003, 
at 102 – 107; G. A. Johnston, The International Labour Organization: Its Work for So-
cial and Economic Progress, London: Europa Publications, 1970, at 279; K. Basu, H. 
Horn, L. Román, J. Shapiro (eds.), International Labor Standards: History, Theory and 
Policy Options, London: Blackwell Publishing, 2006, at 271 – 302; G. Tsogas, Labor 
Regulation in a global Economy, London: M.E. Shark, Armonk, 2001, at 52 – 54; E. 
Weisband, Discursive Multilateralism: global Benchmarks, Shame and Learning in the 
ILO Labor Standards Monitoring Regime, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 44, 
2000, at 643 – 666; among others. 
26 See: P. Alston, Core Labour Standards’ and the Transformation of the International La-
bour Regime, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 15, 2004, at 495 – 497; 
P. Alston, Labour Rights Provisions in U.S. Trade Law: ‘Aggressive Unilateralism?, Hu-
man Rights Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1993; L. Compa, J. S. Vogt, Labor Rights in 
the generalized System of Preferences: A 20 Year Review, Comparative Labor Law and 
Policy Journal, Vol. 22, 2001, at 236; K. M. Reynolds, The Erosion of Tariff Prefer-
ences: The Impact of U.S. Tariff Reductions on Developing Countries, at 15 – 16 (paper 
presented at American University). Available at:  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstract_id=763665.
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only under the conditions specified in the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) enacted in 194727 and revised in 1994.28
Under GATT a government may impose three kinds of restrictions on im-
ports. The first is a complete prohibition of imports from a certain country. 
The second is to prohibit shipments of certain kinds of products, and the third 
is to prohibit import of products manufactured in a certain way. The first two 
restrictions are ruled out by Articles I and IX of GATT, which establish the 
principle of “most favoured nation”, meaning that any exporting nation that 
is a party to GATT must have a status that matches that for the importing na-
tion’s most favoured trading partners (prohibition of discrimination in trade). 
Those articles also place limits on trading quotas. According to the regulations 
of GATT such trading restrictions may nevertheless be imposed if they are 
in response to an exporting nation’s violation of international obligations in 
its relationship to the importing nation. The problem here is that violations of an 
exporting nation’s obligations with respect to the ILS usually crop up in its 
relations with individual persons or with international organizations, rather 
than with an importing nation. The exceptions would be violations of obliga-
tions established erga omnes and the norms that are jus cogens.29 Because of the 
extremely restrictive approach to applying this sort of norm to ILL, the only 
example at present of imposing a complete trade embargo in response to viola-
tions of labour law is the case of Myanmar.30 
27 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1947 (GATT, 1947). Available at: http://
www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_e.pdf. 
28 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1994 (GATT, 1994). Available at: http://
www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/06-gatt.pdf.
29 See: B. Simma, P. Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and 
general Principles, Australian Yearbook of International Law, No. 17, 1992, at 82 
– 108; R. Müllerson, Ordering Anarchy—International Law in International Society, 
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2000, at 1 – 387; R. M. M. Wallace, A. 
Holliday, International Law, London: Sweet & Maxwell ltd., 2006, at 25-38; M. E. 
O’Connell, The Power and Purpose of International Law, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008, at 9 et al.
30 For the EU: European Union Council Regulation (EC) No. 194/2008 of 25 February 
2008 renewing and strengthening the restrictive measures in respect of Burma/Myanmar and 
repealing Regulation (EC) No 817/2006. 10.3.2008, Official Journal of the European 
Union L 66/1, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri
=OJ:L:2008:066:0001:0087:EN:PDF. For the USA: Burmese Freedom and Democracy 
Act of 2003, Public Law 108–61—July 28, 2003, available at: http://www.treasury.
gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/bfda_2003.pdf. For Canada: Special Eco-
nomic Measures (Burma) Regulation, 2007, Canada Gazette, Vol. 141, No. 26 – De-
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Article III of GATT allows the third kind of trade restriction, prohibiting 
the import of products manufactured by objectionable means (for example, 
using child labour), if the restriction applies equally to any country of origin. 
However, for a government to apply this kind of restriction legally in accord-
ance with GATT, it must ascertain in a certain manner what means of produc-
tion are used by specific producers. One allowable way to do this is through 
certification of production carried out either on a voluntary or a mandatory 
basis at the expense of private parties or of the government. GoodWeave In-
ternational (formerly Rugmark), an association of non-governmental organi-
zations that monitors the use of child labour in manufacturing rugs, may be 
adduced as an example of voluntary non-state certification.31 The regulations 
of GATT do not extend to this kind of certification so that it is beset by es-
sentially the same sort of problems of status and application as are corporate 
codes of conduct.32 There are also cases of voluntary certification undertaken 
by governments to ascertain that production conforms to ILS, for example, 
on the basis of the 2002 Belgian law for the promotion of socially responsible 
production.33 But measures of this sort are controversial in view of Article III-
4 of GATT because one can charge that a government is employing them to 
protect their own producers rather than to defend human rights. The protec-
tion of wildlife brings up analogous sorts of issues, such as the tuna-dolphin 
case in which the USA imposed a requirement on imported tuna that fisher-
men must employ expensive equipment to avoid inadvertently killing dolphins 
while catching tuna. A special meeting of the GATT commission found that 
this requirement gave an indirect advantage to US fishermen because their 
Mexican competitors could not obtain the necessary equipment and thus was 
in contravention of GATT.34 
cember 26, 2007, available at http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2008/
canadagazette/SP2-2-141-26.pdf at 93-105. For Australia: Autonomous Sanctions Re-
gulations 2011, Australian Government Federal Register of Legislation, available at: 
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/F2012C00562.
31 See this organization’s website: GoodWeave International, available at: http://www.
goodweave.org/home.php.
32 More on this topic is provided later in this article.
33 The text in Dutch is headed: Wet ter bevordering van sociaal verantwoorde productie 27 
Februari 2002. Available, with a link to the French version, at: http://www.ejusti-
ce.just.fgov.be/cgi_loi/change_lg.pl?language=nl&la=N&cn=2002022732&tab
le_name=wet.
34 For more detail on this topic see: Atleson et al., op. cit. (fn. 25), at 245 – 247.
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Employing the alternative of mandatory certification is almost unworkable 
in practice because it would cover all production anywhere in the world.35
The discussion so far should suffice to show what is meant by claiming 
that international trade and the compliance of governments with ILS operate 
as two independent systems, but it also shows how this constitutes a serious 
threat to compliance with the norms of ILL.
III. IS THERE ANY WAY OUT OF THE PROBLEM?
A large body of literature has been written about the negative consequences 
of financial globalization for labour standards.36 Globalization has caused the 
production of physical commodities to be transferred to the countries with the 
lowest social costs for producers, a practice which empties out workplaces in 
developed countries as it simultaneously fosters widespread infringements of 
workers’ rights in developing countries “racing to the bottom”. In this context 
contemporary financial globalization is often discussed as if it were some kind 
of absolutely self-sufficient process that is independent of anyone’s will. Of 
course, that is not the case. Globalization and the disproportionate growth of 
MNC will continue so long as liberal legal systems offer investors the privilege 
of redirecting the flow of funds at any moment from one country to another. 
35 On this topic see: J. Denkers, The World Trade Organization and Import Bans in Res-
ponse to Violations of Fundamental Labour Rights, Antwerp et al.: Intersentia, 2008, at 
210 – 211.
36 See D. Rodrik, Labor Standards in International Trade: Do They Matter and What Do 
We Do About Them?, in R. Z. Lawrence, D. Rodrik, J. Whalley (eds.), Emerging Agen-
da for global Trade: High Stakes for Developing Countries, Washington DC: Overseas 
Development Council, distributed by the Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996; B. 
Smarzynska Javorcik, M. Spatareanu, Do Foreign Investors Care about Labor Market 
Regulations?, Review of World Economics, Vol. 141, No. 4, 2005, at 375 – 403; D. 
Kucera, Core Labour Standards and Foreign Direct Investment, International Labour 
Review, Vol. 141, 2002, at 31 – 69; G. Dewit, G. Holger, C. Montagna, Should 
I Stay or Should I go? Foreign Direct Investment, Employment Protection and Domestic 
Anchorage, Review of World Economics, Vol. 145, 2009, at 93 – 110; T. Boeri, J. 
F. Jimeno, The Effects of Employment Protection: Learning from Variable Enforcement, 
European Economic Review, Vol. 49, No. 8, 2005, at 2057 – 2077; R. B. Davies, 
K. Chaitanya Vadlamannati, A Race to the Bottom in Labour Standards? An Empirical 
Investigation, Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 103, 2013, at 1 – 14; D. K. 
Brown, A. V. Deardorff, R. M. Stern, Labor Standards and Human Rights: Implications 
for International Trade and Investment, in Z. Drabek, P. C. Mavroidis (eds.), Regula-
tion of Foreign Investment: Challenges to International Harmonization, Singapore: World 
Scientific Studies in International Economics, 2013; among others.
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The Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz has written that “if globalization contin-
ues to be conducted as it has been in the past ... globalization will not only 
succeed in promoting development but will continue to create poverty and 
instability.”37
Currently the number of international trade agreements is growing rapidly. 
From 1995 through December 2015 the number of trade agreements about 
which the WTO had received notification has grown from 46 to 265. The 
share of trade agreements with labour provisions is also growing: almost 55 per 
cent of goods exported took place within such a framework in 2014, compared 
with 42 per cent in 1995.38 However, labour provisions in such agreements will 
always remain a supplementary feature, at best intended to compensate par-
tially for their own negative social effects (income inequality, unemployment, 
threats to collective bargaining etc.). It is quite likely that most such clauses 
will serve merely as a PR tool for to demonstrate the social responsibility of the 
parties to trade agreements. 
Only when investors are restricted in redirecting capital will globalization 
itself, along with its negative outcomes for any but financial capitalists, be sig-
nificantly restrained. In order for the ILO to fend off criticism that it is itself 
an “agency for globalization”39 it must definitively and unambiguously state its 
position on the issues of international trade. This is an extremely difficult step 
to take both psychologically and politically because the ILO sets itself up as a 
universal (global) international organization and receives significant financial 
backing from the USA, which is the main sponsor of globalization. Neverthe-
less, to restore the international authority of the ILO and fulfil its mission ac-
cording to its Constitution and the Declaration of Philadelphia, this is exactly 
what needs to be done. Such a change in policy may become more feasible fol-
lowing a possible adverse reaction to the wave of globalization at the beginning 
of the 21st century when sovereign states acquiesced in a significant transfer 
of their powers to the MNC. Both developed and developing economies are 
interested in regaining those powers and limiting the powers of uncontrolled 
international financial capital. The recent election of Trump in the US seems 
37 J. E. Stiglitz, globalization and Its Discontents, New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2002, 
at 248.
38 ILO, Assessment of labour provisions in trade and investment arrangements, Geneva: ILO, 
2016, at 1.
39 G. Standing, The ILO: An Agency for globalization?, Development and Change, Vol. 
39, No. 3, 2008, at 355 – 384.
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to be one of the signs that the “motherland” of financial globalization is in-
creasingly motivated by regaining national powers. Needless to say, other in-
fluential states would support the idea of recovering their sovereign powers.40
The ILO cannot ignore the increasing degradation of employment and la-
bour rights around the world and pursue only cosmetic proposals and declara-
tions in favour of improving separate minor aspects of labour or protection of 
particular minorities of workers while the whole system of employment and 
labour rights around the world is being undermined. The ILO should prom-
ulgate legally binding norms and adopt a policy that recognizes how interna-
tional financial relations are intimately connected with issues of labour rights 
worldwide. Unfortunately, the ILO currently follows a quite different policy. 
In the Global Jobs Pact adopted by the International Labour Conference in 
2009 as a response to the world financial crisis, one of the main points was 
the necessity of “promoting efficient and well-regulated trade and markets that 
benefit all and avoiding protectionism by countries. Varying development lev-
els of countries must be taken into account in lifting barriers to domestic and 
foreign markets.”41 This statement shows that international free trade has al-
ready been accepted by the ILO as an irreversible fact that allows at most a few 
adjustments that take social considerations into account. The ILO then seems 
like a “friend of the court” that is trying to “lighten the sentence” imposed on 
social rights by the founders of the Bretton Woods system. The ILO’s studies 
of the consequences of the economic crisis for developing countries have been 
seen as a justification for this approach.42 Following the adoption of the 1998 
Declaration as it started to carry out its policies on advancing fundamental 
principles, the ILO modified the thrust of its policies to make them less con-
frontational. As Tony Royle has maintained, this undercuts the effectiveness 
of the ILO in advancing ILS.43 Similarly inconclusive and devoid of any con-
crete legal obligations are the ILO’s own Decent Work Programme and the 
40 See, for example: V. Przhilenskiy, M. V. Zakharova, Which Way Is the Russian Dou-
ble-Headed Eagle Looking?, Russian Law Journal, Vol. 2, 2016, at 6 – 25. 
41 ILO, Recovering from the crisis: A global Jobs Pact. Resolution adopted by the International 
Labour Conference at its Ninety-eighth Session, Geneva: ILO, 2009, at 9 – 10.
42 M. Jansen, E. von Uexkull, Trade and Employment in the global Crisis, Geneva: ILO, 
Academic Foundation, 2010.
43 T. Royle, The ILO’s Shift to Promotional Principles and the “Privatization” of Labour 
Rights: An Analysis of Labour Standards, Voluntary Self-Regulation and Social Clauses, 
The International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 
Vol. 26, No. 3, 2010, at 261.
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Better Work Programme that the ILO has undertaken in partnership with the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), which is a member of the World 
Bank Group with funding from major MNC and the governments of several 
economically developed countries.44
There is also the view that the current global economy should be over-
hauled along regional lines.45 This would mean creating several economic me-
ga-regions in competition with each other without impairing the social rights 
of their citizens through a “race to the bottom”. If this model of world devel-
opment were put into practice, the problems of poor coordination of labour 
standards for international trade and spotty compliance with ILS would be-
come less severe.
The ILO’s approach to problems in labour relations brought about by glo-
balization and regionalization has come under criticism in several other re-
spects by Canadian specialist Prof Brian Langille. He charges that the ILO 
is insufficiently flexible in formulating ILS and concentrates on compliance 
with those standards without regard for regional differences and the varia-
tion in economic development between countries.46 He also maintains that the 
ILO’s actual application of ILS is a “top down imposition” whereas successful 
application of ILS would require greater involvement of social partners and 
non-governmental organizations. Our position on the flexibility of the ILO 
is exactly the opposite: the ILO is entirely too flexible. There are numerous 
cases when the ILO has criticized national laws and practices over decades for 
being incompatible with ILS without any consequences for the violators.47 In 
discussing the value of modifying the application of ILS in response to regional 
differences it is essential to distinguish the standards that require governments 
to incur some sort of costs from the standards that establish regulations for 
interactions between the various parties to labour law. For example, it would 
make little sense to talk about regional factors when it comes to the obligation 
44 Consult the website for this programme. Available at: http://betterwork.org/global/.
45 On this topic see: I. Wallerstein, The Demise of Neoliberal globalization, MRzine 
(Monthly Review Foundation), February 2008. Available at: http://mrzine.
monthlyreview.org/2008/wallerstein010208.html.
46 B. Langille, Imagining Post “Geneva Consensus” Labor Law for Post “Washington Consen-
sus” Development, Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal, Vol. 31, No. 3, 2010, 
at 523 – 552.
47 N. Lyutov, The ILO System of International Labour Standards and Monitoring Procedures: 
Too Complicated to be Effective?, Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta u Zagrebu, Vol. 64., No. 
2, 2014, at 255 – 276.
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to comply with any of the fundamental principles and rights recognized in the 
ILO Declaration of 1998. Excessive reliance on “soft law” and adjustment to 
regional factors may weaken the ILO as it contends with the negative conse-
quences of globalization.
On whether there is substantial involvement of non-governmental organi-
zations in ILO deliberations, Anne Trebilcock takes exception to Brian Lang-
ille’s position by noting that trade unions and associations of employers are 
deeply involved in the adoption of the ILO’s decrees because of its tripartite 
structure.48 Even this objection fails to take into account the fact that the del-
egates from the IFC are top-echelon functionaries of the very largest associa-
tions of workers and employers who, in the first place, are seldom aware of the 
interests of rank-and-file workers and, second, may not be sufficiently inde-
pendent from employers to protect worker interests. In addition, major official 
trade unions cannot be considered representatives of self-employed workers 
or of workers in the informal sector of the economy.49 Greater involvement of 
non-profit organizations and trade unions in ensuring compliance with ILS is 
an idea worth considering and supporting, although it is quite a complicated 
matter to ascertain whose interests one or another non-governmental organi-
zation is representing and to what extent these organizations are motivated by 
upholding labour rights rather than advancing interests of their own. Special-
ists are examining this issue.50
IV. “PRIVATIZING” INTERNATIONAL LABOUR LAW: NON-GOV-
ERNMENTAL MEANS OF REGULATING LABOUR RELATIONS 
VIA MNC
Apart from rather feeble attempts on the part of governments and inter-
national organizations to mitigate the negative consequence of globalization, 
48 A. Trebilcock, Putting the Record Straight about International Labor Standard Setting, 
Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal, Vol. 31, No. 3, 2010, at 554 – 555.
49 M. Olivier, International Labour and Social Security Standards: A Developing Country 
Critique, International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Rela-
tions, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2013, at 21 – 38; W. Sengenberger, International Labour Stand-
ards in the globalized Economy: Obstacles and Opportunities for Achieving Progress, in J. D. 
R. Craig, S. M. Lynk (eds.), globalization and the Future of Labour Law, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006, at 341.
50 M. Weiss, International Labour Standards: A Complex Public-Private Policy Mix, Inter-
national Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, Vol. 29, No. 
1, 2013, at 13.
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the non-governmental reaction has been the only other response to the “gov-
ernance gap” caused by the abruptly increased power of MNC and by the 
corresponding faltering of governments in their attempts to gain control over 
MNC. 51 This brings up the matter of corporate codes of conduct for MNC 
and an integrated social partnership. The diminishing role of governments in 
regulating labour relations that fall outside of their national boundaries has 
prompted a number of specialists to speak of a new phenomenon in ILL: their 
“privatization”.52 The interaction of private and public actors in legal regula-
tions that may apply beyond national boundaries has prompted the German 
expert, Ulrich Mückenberger, to introduce the concept of “hybrid global la-
bour law”.53
1. Corporate codes of conduct and corporate social responsibility
From the close of the 1980s to the early 1990s in developed countries 
there were campaigns of social labelling intended to convince consumers to 
buy only those products marketed by socially responsible producers. These 
labelling campaigns depended on an authoritative non-governmental organiza-
tion verifying that a product was made without infringing the rights of workers 
or violating ecological standards. Labels to that effect could then be applied 
to the product’s packaging, and consumers could purchase it “with a clear 
conscience”. The non-governmental organizations engaged in social labelling 
created an association called the International Social and Environmental Ac-
creditation and Labelling Alliance.54 Producers who wanted to qualify for so-
cial labelling had to prove not only that they observed the labour rights of their 
own workers but also that the items ordered from their suppliers were in turn 
made without infringing labour rights. This means that the currently favoured 
concept of corporate social responsibility has two components: the internal 
51 See above.
52 B. W. Burkett, J. D. R. Craig, M. Link, Corporate Social Responsibility and Codes of 
Conduct: The Privatization of International Labour Law, presented at the Canadian 
Council on International Law Conference, 15 October, 2004; Royle, op. cit. (fn. 43), 
at 249 – 271.
53 U. Mückenberger, Hybrid global Labour Law, in R. Blanpain, F. Hendrickx (eds.), 
Labour Law Between Change and Tradition: Liber Amicorum Antoine Jacobs, Austin et 
al.: Wolters Kluwer, 2011, at 99 – 116.
54 The International Social and Environmental Accreditation and Labeling Alliance 
(ISEAL Alliance) website: http://www.isealalliance.org/.
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one (that applies to a producer’s own workers) and an external one (that ap-
plies to its suppliers’ workers).55
In order to demonstrate their social responsibility major companies have 
themselves adopted corporate codes of conduct that incorporate basic obliga-
tions of MNC to observe labour rights. Currently most of the major companies 
chartered in the OECD have some sort of corporate code of conduct that ap-
plies to labour. 
At the beginning of the 21st century a new generation of these codes was 
adopted to answer broad criticism of the first round of codes on the grounds 
that they were in most cases adopted to enhance the reputation of the corpo-
ration without indicating any specific steps to protect workers’ rights. Clearly 
companies would be quite reluctant to adopt any code that entails additional 
financial burdens for themselves or for their suppliers. To the extent that veri-
fication of compliance with these codes is from their inception either absent 
entirely or left to the good intentions of the companies that adopt them, a “fox 
in the henhouse” scenario comes into play, with the MNC in the role of the 
fox that must control itself in the worker henhouse. As a consequence interna-
tional organizations and several specialized companies (mostly auditors) have 
adopted their own codes of conduct to which international employers may 
subscribe. These codes of conduct are regarded as “external” in contrast to the 
“internal” ones that companies themselves may adopt.
Studies have divided codes of conduct into two types:56 those that are ba-
sically aspirational and intended to show a company’s pursuit of certain ide-
als without going further toward declarations of general principles (such as 
fairness, a desire to contribute to social and economic development, and the 
like); and those that contain more concrete obligations for MNC concerning 
labour and ecological standards. The second concrete type usually provides for 
55 On corporate social responsibility see: A. K. Chatterji, S. Listokin, A Comment on 
‘Corporate Social Responsibility and Workers’ Rights, Comparative Labor Law and Poli-
cy Journal, Vol. 30, No. 1, 2008, at 11 – 15; L. Compa, Corporate Social Responsibil-
ity and Workers’ Rights, Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal, Vol. 30, No. 1, 
2008, at 1 – 10; Promoting a European framework for Corporate Social Responsibility, a 
European Commission Green Paper, Brussels: COM[2001], 2001, at 32. Avail-
able at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2001:0366:
FIN:en:PDF.
56 A. Florini, Business and global governance: The growing Role of Corporate Codes of Con-
duct, published on the Brookings Institution website, available at: http://www.
brookings.edu/articles/2003/spring_business_florini.aspx.
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external verification of how well an MNC adheres to its own code of conduct. 
In that case it makes little difference whether the code of conduct is internal 
or external because external organizations that have the confidence of civil 
society and the ability to apply social labelling to a company’s products review 
whether an MNC has followed through on the obligations that it accepted.
The typical content of an aspirational code57 devised by an MNC itself 
usually stipulates more general obligations for the company58 than those de-
rived from codes developed by non-governmental organizations. External 
codes of conduct may contain much more detailed provisions. For example, 
the overview of the code of conduct of the Fair Labor Association (FLA, a 
non-profit organization founded in the USA) merely mentions freedom of as-
sociation and collective bargaining.59 However, the complete version of this 
code incorporates a much more detailed set of standards called Compliance 
Benchmarks.60 Among these are 24 specific demands related to freedom of as-
sociation and collective bargaining that are clearly based on the corresponding 
principles developed by the ILO.
Verification of compliance with codes presents a larger problem than their 
content. Many internal codes at this time include reservations about external 
verification of compliance. Although most of the major MNC subscribe to 
some external codes, they nevertheless retain their own internal ones. This 
equivocation on the part of corporations bears a striking resemblance to the 
way governments with their own labour legislation have at the same time rati-
fied international agreements related to labour without much regard for con-
sistency between the various standards adopted.
57 The OECD examined the content of 148 codes adopted by MNC. On the norms 
most frequently encountered see: J. Rhys, Corporate Codes of Conduct: Self-Regulation 
in a global Economy, a Technology, Business and Society Programme Paper pub-
lished by the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 2001, at 
22. See also: P. Macklem, M. Trebilcock, New Labour Standards Compliance Strategies: 
Corporate Codes of Conduct and Social Labeling Programs, a Research Report prepared 
for the Federal Labour Standards Review, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, 
2006, at 50.
58 For a representative example see the standards published by Adidas available at: 
http://www.adidas-group.com/media/filer_public/11/c7/11c72b1b-b6b2-4fe7-b0b9-
59c7242143e9/adidas_group_workplace_standards_january_2016_en.pdf.
59 See the Fair Labor Association’s Workplace Code of Conduct available at: http://
www.fairlabor.org/our-work/labor-standards.
60 See the Fair Labor Association’s Compliance benchmarks available at: http://www.
fairlabor.org/sites/default/files/fla_complete_code_and_benchmarks.pdf.
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Even external codes that mostly avoid the fox-in-the-henhouse problem 
have nevertheless raised particular concerns among specialists. The first con-
cern is about the profusion of international trade union associations, human 
rights organizations, commercial campaigns, and social campaigns that com-
pete with each other to claim a niche for themselves in the establishment and 
application of international labour standards. Some of the better-known ones 
are the Business Social Compliance Initiative (BSCI), the Fair Labor Associa-
tion, the Worker Rights Consortium (WRC), the Ethical Trading Initiative 
(ETI), the Fair Trade Foundation, Social Accountability International (SAI), 
and Worldwide Responsible Accredited Production (WRAP). There are many 
other organizations active in this field.61 International non-governmental or-
ganizations, governmental institutions, and several companies promulgate 
their own codes, and that serves only to complicate the already chaotic mass 
of material on these topics even more. Several of these institutions operate 
commercially and receive payment in return for applying social labelling and 
in so doing undermine faith in the very idea of social labelling. All these var-
ied institutions conflict so much as they compete with each other that they 
fail to combine forces even to advance their authority in general. Although 
the texts of all these codes broadly resemble each other, it is very difficult for 
consumers to be sure that a particular social labelling organization is operating 
ethically and really maintains control over international employers. To address 
this problem the International Standards Association (ISO) in 2010 adopted a 
new international standard for social responsibility (ISO 26000) with the pur-
pose of bringing some consistency to the disorderly process of generating “pri-
vate ILS”.62 However, that ISO standard is not a legally binding instrument.63 
The second concern even for external codes is the very serious misgiving 
that the much less stringent regulations on MNC may drive out or water down 
national labour legislation and ILS. Even without the disruption of the social 
61 For additional detail see: ISO, guidance on Social Responsibility. Draft International 
Standard ISO/DIS 26000, published in ISO Doc. No.: ISO/TMB/WG SR N 172 
(30-39), Geneva: ISO, 2009. Available at: http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink/fet
ch/-8929321/8929339/8929348/3935837/ISO_DIS_26000_Guidance_on_Soci-
al_Responsibility.pdf?nodeid=8385026&vernum=-2.
62 ISO, guidance on Social Responsibility – ISO 26000:2010(E), Geneva: ISO, 2010.
63 On this topic see: R. Hahn, Standardizing Social Responsibility? New Perspectives on 
guidance Documents and Management System Standards for Sustainable Development, 
IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, Vol. 59, No. 4, 2012, at 717 – 
727.
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partnership system that is now occurring, the risk would still remain that social 
partnership might be superseded by the “voluntary” actions of corporations 
that would create the illusion that workers no longer need classical collective 
bargaining and collective agreements. Otto Kahn-Freund has stated that work-
ers’ rights that are won through involved collective negotiations are more im-
portant and valuable than those handed to workers as “gifts from on high”.64 
Because of this risk of devaluation of ILS Wolfgang Däubler has mounted a 
sharp criticism of the concept of corporate social responsibility as a whole.65 
2. International framework agreements and social dialogue at the 
international level
The most natural response to the negative consequences of globalization 
would be internationalization of the trade union movement.66 International 
trade unions as such have been in existence for a long time, having started in 
the 19th century.67 However, uniting workers at an international level so that 
they are on a more equal footing with MNC encounters many more difficulties 
than uniting them within a single country.68 This is the case because of radically 
different systems and traditions in the realms of labour law and social partner-
ship in different nations and also because of the “national egoism” of workers 
who regard their foreign colleagues mostly as competitors rather than allies in 
negotiating with an extensive – global – employer, and even because of the usu-
al mundane obstacles that stand in the way of communicating internationally.
64 P. Davies, M. Freedland, Kahn-Freund’s Labour and the Law, London: Stevens, 1983, 
at 14.
65 W. Däubler, Corporate Social Responsibility: A Way to Make Deregulation More Accept-
able?, in R. Blanpain, F. Hendricx (eds.), Labour Law between Change and Tradition: 
Liber Amicorum Antoine Jacobs, Austin et al.: Wolters Kluwer, 2011, at 49 – 58.
66 P. Sheldon, B. Gan, G. J. Bamber, Collective Bargaining: An International Developments 
and Challenges, in R. Blanpain (ed.), Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 
in Industrialized Market Economies, 10th ed., The Hague et al.: Wolters Kluwer, 2010, 
at 609 – 658.
67 J. P. Windmuller, S. K. Pursey, J. Baker, The International Trade Union Movement, in 
Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Industrialized Market Economies, 
10th ed., The Hague et al.: Wolters Kluwer, 2010, at 71 – 96.
68 On this topic see: J. Rojot, The Right to Bargain Collectively: An International Perspective 
on its Extent and Relevance, International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and 
Industrial Relations, Vol. 20, No. 4, 2004, at 513 – 532; J. Rojot, International 
Collective Bargaining Relations, in M. J. Morley, P. Gunningle, D. G. Collings (eds.), 
global Industrial Relations, London and New York: Routledge, 2006, at 254 – 255.
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Even so, global trade union federations, that is, international trade unions 
uniting workers in specific sectors or professions, have been able to conclude 
scores of global or international framework agreements (hereinafter both will 
be referred to as IFA) with several major MNC.69 According to sociological 
studies, the main motivation that induced a series of companies to sign IFAs 
was to maintain a favourable image in the eyes of foreign consumers, investors, 
tender committees, etc. rather than to respond to pressure from trade unions.70 
At present the reach of IFAs is rather small: specialists estimate that as of 
2010 IFAs covered in the neighbourhood of 6 million workers out of 77 mil-
lion workers employed by MNC.71 Furthermore, in contrast with traditional 
agreements entered into by social partners or collective bargaining at various 
levels within states72, IFAs are not formally binding in law, and MNC may not 
be held legally responsible for any breaches of them.73 Nevertheless to regard 
IFAs exclusively as “soft law” would not be correct: global associations of trade 
unions may conduct campaigns across national borders aimed at compelling 
MNC to observe the IFAs that they have signed or to compel MNC to enter 
into IFAs if they have previously refused to do so. Such campaigns are sporadic 
in nature, but they do take place and sometimes end in success. The best re-
69 See Framework Agreements published on the Global Unions website: http://www.
global-unions.org/framework-agreements.html?lang=en; Global Framework 
Agreements published on the United Nations Global Compact website: http://
www.unglobalcompact.org/Issues/Labour/Global_Framework_Agreements.html. 
For an evaluation of the content of the agreements see: D. Stevis, International 
Framework Agreements and global Social Dialogue: Parameters and Prospects, ILO Em-
ployment Sector, Employment Working Paper No. 47, Geneva: ILO, 2010. Availa-
ble at: http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/ - -ed_emp/documents/publication/
wcms_122176.pdf.
70 K. Papadakis, Adopting International Framework Agreements in the Russian Federation, 
South Africa and Japan: Management Motivations, in K. Papadakis (ed.), Shaping glob-
al Industrial Relations: The Impact of International Framework Agreements, Basingstoke, 
New York: ILO, Palgrave MacMillan, 2011, at 69.
71 K. Papadakis, globalizing Industrial Relations: What Role for International Framework 
Agreements?, in S. Hayter (ed.), The Role of Collective Bargaining in the global Economy: 
Negotiating for Social Justice, Geneva: ILO with Edward Elgar, 2011, at 280 – 281.
72 Except for agreements concluded within the UK, which are by tradition regarded as 
‘gentlemen’s agreements’ if their texts do not state otherwise.
73 For more detail on the legal status of IFAs see: A. Sobczak, Legal Dimensions of Inter-
national Framework Agreements in the Field of Corporate Social Responsibility, in K. Papa-
dakis (ed.), Cross-Border Social Dialogue and Agreements: An Emerging global Industrial 
Relations Framework?, Geneva: ILO, 2007, at 115 – 130. 
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sults obtained by workers’ representatives at the international level have been 
accomplished within the EU.74 This was borne out by the drastic political and 
social reaction to the steamship company Viking Line when it attempted to 
change the flag flown by one of its ships from Finland to Estonia.75 
The overwhelming majority of IFAs are concluded by international trade 
union federations with MNC that have their headquarters in the EU. Apart 
from the EU, some IFAs have been signed with MNC that are based in Aus-
tralia, Indonesia, Canada, Malaysia, New Zealand, Russia, South Africa, and 
Japan. 
Sometimes workers’ interests gain representation in international collec-
tive bargaining via global works councils that operate in ways analogous to 
the European Works Councils (EWC) established in the EU.76 That kind of 
global works council managed to block DaimlerChrysler’s attempt to transfer 
its production from South Africa, where workers had mounted a strike, to its 
facilities in Brazil and Germany.77 It is worth mentioning that this MNC had 
its origins in the EU. The DaimlerChrysler dispute is of interest also because 
its IFA, as well as its corporate code of conduct (see above), had allowed for 
termination of its contracts with its subcontractors that infringe ILS. As a 
result of pressure from trade unions, DaimlerChrysler rejected services from 
eight of its suppliers in Brazil.78
74 See, for example: F. Dorssemont, T. Japsers, A. A. H. van Hoek (eds.), Cross-Border 
Collective Actions in Europe: A Legal Challenge, Antwerpen-Oxford: Intersentia, 2007.
75 International Transport Workers Federation v Viking Line ABP, ECJ Case No. C-438/05 
of December 11, 2007. See also: R. Blanpain (ed.) with A. M. Świątkowski (guest 
editor), The Laval and Viking Cases: Freedom of Services and Establishment v. Industrial 
Conflicts in the European Union and Russia, Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law In-
ternational, 2009; N. Lyutov, Konflikt mezhdu fundamental’nymi pravami rabotnikov i 
predprinimatelei v praktika Evropeiskogo suda spravedlivosti [The Conflict between the Fun-
damental Rights of Workers and Entrepreneurs in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Justice], Trudovoe pravo [Labour Law], No. 12, 2008, at 70 – 79. 
76 According to Directive 2009/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 
May 2009 on the establishment of a European Works Council or a procedure in Community-
scale undertakings and Community-scale groups of undertakings for the purposes of informing 
and consulting employees (Recast), Official Journal of the European Communities, 16 
May 2009, L 122/28.
77 I. Wick, Workers’ tool or PR ploy? A guide to codes of international labour practice, 4th 
edition, Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert-Schtiftung, 2005, at 24.
78 J. Holdcroft, International Framework Agreements: A Progress Report, Metal World, No. 
3, 2007, at 21.
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Another notable success for international coordination between representa-
tives of workers came during the merger of ABB with Alstom from 1993 to 
2003 when trade unions and the EWC for Alston played a fundamental role 
both in shaping the programme for consolidating management of the company 
during restructuring, which entailed severe personnel cuts, and also in avert-
ing Alstom’s bankruptcy.79 However, the integration of the EU governments 
(especially of the “old EU” meaning the Western European countries) has 
proceeded so far that, in the first place, it is quite a stretch to speak of interna-
tional solidarity of workers there; and, second, even within this regional union 
it would not be justified to speak of a properly functioning social dialogue 
throughout the entire EU. The “old” and “new” EU members are engaged in a 
major conflict over the level of income for their workers.80 
A very significant example of the effectiveness of social dialogue at an inter-
national level is provided by Costa Rica, where the social partnership system 
has been infiltrated by what are referred to as “yellow” trade unions that are in 
fact controlled by employers. Because the Chiquita Banana Company had an 
IFA, dialogue was opened between the employer and trade unions representing 
a minority of workers.81 A thoroughgoing comparative analysis of corporate 
codes of conduct with IFAs has indicated that, even though both declarations 
are nominally “soft law”, IFAs contain far more specific obligations for the 
79 R. Erne, European Unions: Labor’s Quest for a Transnational Democracy, Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 2008, at 128 – 156.
80 The gap in incomes between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ EU countries led to a serious crisis 
as workers from the ‘new’ countries were free to relocate to the ‘old’ ones. The most 
indicative illustration of this crisis was in the Viking Line (see above) and Laval 
cases that were brought before the European Court of Justice. See Laval un Partneri 
Ltd v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundets avdelning 
1, Byggettan and Svenska Elektrikerförbundet, ECJ Judgment (18 December 2007) Case 
No.C-341/05. For more details see M. Rönmar (ed.), EU Industrial Relations v. Nati-
onal Industrial Relations: Comparative and Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Aspen: Wolters 
Kluwer, 2008; R. Eklund, A Swedish Perspective on Laval, Comparative Labor Law & 
Policy Journal, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2008, at 551 – 571; G. Orlandini, Trade Union Rights 
and Market Freedoms: The European Court of Justice Sets out the Rules, Comparative 
Labor Law & Policy Journal, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2008, at 571 – 603.
81 I. Schömann, A. Sobczak, P. Wilke, E. Voss, Codes of Conduct and International 
Framework Agreements: New Forms of governance at Company Level. Case study: Chiq-
uita, European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Condi-
tions, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 
2008, at 12. Available at: http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/pubdocs/2007/92/en/1/
ef0792en.pdf.
N. Lyutov: Traditional International Labour Law and the New “global” Kind:...52
employer and also mechanisms to ensure that those obligations are fulfilled.82 
This is the case because IFAs are usually drawn up through negotiations be-
tween social partners. They are not arrived at unilaterally by an MNC to in-
clude mostly vague and abstract formulas designed above all to advertise the 
company’s virtues rather than protect the labour rights of its workers and 
those working for its suppliers and subcontractors.
On the other hand, IFAs, in contrast with collective contracts and agree-
ments concluded at a national level, do not generally contain specific provi-
sions for the amount of wages or other crucial labour conditions; they merely 
establish a general framework for relations between the social partners. At 
this time the solitary exception to this rule is the IFA based on the ILO Mari-
time Labour Convention of 2006 (ILO) concluded between the International 
Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) and employers of the International Mar-
itime Employers’ Council.83
V. CONCLUSION
It would appear then that the “new” ILL provided by privately owned com-
panies and non-governmental organizations cannot be effective or would not 
even exist without the involvement of the traditional key players in “classical” 
ILL – governments and international organizations.
The authoritative British specialist on labour law Bob Hepple maintained 
that the role of the ILO in applying both corporate codes of conduct and ILS 
may lie in its function as an independent mediator for resolving disputes be-
tween MNC and global trade union federations, and ultimately in the estab-
lishment of the ILO as an international labour tribunal for resolving transna-
tional labour conflicts.84 This proposal is worth supporting even though there 
82 A. García-Muňoz Alhambra, B. ter Haar, A. Kun, Soft on the inside, Hard on the Out-
side: An Analysis of the Legal Nature of New Forms of International Labour Law, Interna-
tional Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, Vol. 27, No. 4, 
2011, at 362; Schömann et al., op. cit. (fn. 81), at 94.
83 See 2015 – 2017 IBF Framework TCC Agreement available at: http://www.itfseafa-
rers.org/files/seealsodocs/33555/20122014ibfframeworktccagreement.pdf.
84 B. Hepple, Does Law Matter? The Future of Binding Norms, in G. P. Politakis (ed.), Pro-
tecting Labour Rights as Human Rights: Present and Future of International Supervision. Pro-
ceedings of the International Colloquium on the 80th Anniversary of the ILO Committee of Ex-
perts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations held in geneva, 24-25 November 
2006, Geneva: ILO, 2007, at 230 – 231. Available at:  http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/
groups/public/@ed_norm/@normes/documents/publication/wcms_087817.pdf.
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has been no sign that the ILO is moving in that direction since the suggestion 
was made quite a while ago at one of the ILO’s own round tables.
Another way to modernize the effect of the ILO and other international or-
ganizations on labour would be to design coordinated actions for transnational 
labour inspections, which may exert significantly tighter controls over compli-
ance with ILS “in the field” when coordinating with traditional international 
and non-governmental organizations.85
Interaction between traditional and non-governmental entities with sourc-
es for ILL might go a long way toward solving one of the most important prob-
lems in current labour law. There is discussion of the quite significant share of 
the labour market that is now informal. Quite often in developing countries 
the informal portion of the labour market is larger than the portion with of-
ficially constituted labour relations, and the share of the informal market is 
trending still higher.86 Traditional forms of law are useless when applied to the 
informal sector. Mechanisms that allow for interaction between social partners 
may possibly ameliorate the situation to a certain extent.
However, the more fundamental problem in the current status of ILL, 
regardless of any consideration of traditional institutions or new ones, non-
governmental initiatives, or frameworks is the drastically increased mobility 
of capital coupled with the much more restricted ability of workers to choose 
where they work. In order to bring about significantly more effective applica-
tion of ILS, the forces of international trade unions, other non-governmental 
organizations, and the ILO must be combined and directed not only at the 
integration of ILS into international trade, but also at limiting the unimpeded 
flow of capital that leads to the “race to the bottom”. There is not much sign so 
far that this is the way things are heading. Instead, any socially oriented enti-
ties are coming under still more pressure from free trade agreements proposed 
by the USA and MNC.87
85 For more on this topic see: M. A. García-Muñoz Alhambra, B. ter Haar, A. Kun, 
Independent Monitoring of Private Transnational Regulation of Labour Standards: A Pro-
posal for a “Transnational Labour Inspectorate” System, in E. Ales, I. Senatori (eds.), 
The Transnational Dimension of Labour Relations: A New Order in the Making? Atti del-
l’XI Convegno internazionale in ricordo di Marco Biagi, Torino: G. Giappichelli Editore, 
2013, at 254 – 291. Available at: http://www.labourlawresearch.net/sites/default/
files/papers/TLI-final.pdf.
86 On this topic see, for example: Olivier, op. cit. (fn. 49), at 21 – 38; Sengenberger, op. 
cit. (fn. 49), at 341.
87 Specifically, the already adopted Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) [trade] agree-
ment and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) that is now 
under discussion.
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Sažetak
Prof. dr. sc. Nikita Lyutov *
TRADICIONALNO I NOVO “GLOBALNO” MEÐUNARODNO 
RADNO PRAVO – MOŽE LI SE USKLADITI NJIHOVO 
DJELOVANJE? 
U radu se razmatra problem kako je međunarodno radno pravo, do sada uglavnom 
razvijano odlukama Međunarodne organizacije rada (MOR), suočeno s novim oblikom 
“globalnog” radnog prava nastalog uslijed promjena u oblicima zapošljavanja zbog 
globalizacije i rasta uloge međunarodnih korporacija. Konkurentni utjecaji u području 
uređenja radnih prava još nisu postigli stabilan i produktivan odnos te autor u radu 
identificira nekoliko dodirnih točaka u kojima se oni sukobljavaju, kao i pozadinske 
silnice koje utječu na navedeni odnos. U članku se također analizira nekoliko prijedloga 
kako bi trebalo urediti odnos međunarodnog i “globalnog” radnog prava. Posebna 
pozornost posvećena je mogućnosti povezivanja standarda međunarodnog radnog prava i 
međunarodne trgovine. Naime, dosadašnji napori na uključenju “društvene klauzule” u 
međunarodne trgovinske ugovore u okviru WTO-a bili su neuspješni. Autor smatra da 
je trenutačno stanje rijetkog i slabog povezivanja međunarodnih trgovinskih ugovora s 
radnopravnim pitanjima problematično te zaključuje da je potrebno znatnije ograničenje 
u slobodnom protoku kapitala iz jedne u drugu zemlju kako bi se izbjegla “utrka do dna” 
među zemljama u razvoju te da bi se izbjeglo općenito smanjenje prava radnika u cijelom 
svijetu. 
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